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Information Commissioner’s foreword 
 
National and international reforms in information access mean that there is an increasing 
expectation of greater openness by the public sector. In line with these changes, public sector 
information is also increasingly recognised in legislation as a community resource which 
community members must be able to access, unless this is contrary to the public interest. 
Importantly for public sector managers, who are charged with achieving important economic, 
social and environmental goals effectively, efficiently, economically and ethically, information 
can also be a strategic asset. 
 
This paper is the fifth instalment of a series examining the impact of transparency and how it 
can be used as a strategic management tool. Other papers include: 
 Transparency and public sector performance 
 Transparency and policy implementation 
 Transparency and productivity 
 Transparency in practice: The United Kingdom Experience 
 
This series is aimed at objectively evaluating the available evidence as to whether openness can 
be a far more powerful tool than secrecy in serving the public interest. Where transparency can 
be used as a tool, the series also identifies the practical application and the lessons learnt so far. 
Importantly, this series seeks to articulate the case for transparency by showing how 
transparency can be used as a means to the end: effective policy implementation while 
minimising costs to the taxpayer. 
 
Transparency of information about expenditure and performance of contracts for government 
funded services is an important aid in enabling government and the community to ensure that 
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public funds are working as intended to meet community needs and to identify waste. It is also 
important that government has sufficient useful performance information on delivery of 
publicly funded services to strengthen decision-making, including for prioritising future 
expenditure. 
 
This paper establishes the current state of evidence concerning transparency and the 
performance of outsourced government services. The paper discusses three aspects of 
outsourcing; value-for-money efficiency, effectiveness of performance, and publicity of 
performance information and explores a number of lessons for both government and public 
sector managers on how to increase the extent of transparency and, thereby, the quality of 
performance of outsourced services. 
 
Governments are now beginning to realise the potential benefits of greater transparency 
and accountability in public administration, including for example, through Open Data 
initiatives. It is my hope that this paper and others in the transparency series will continue to 
challenge thinking and encourage the public sector to be more open and responsive to the 
community’s needs and expectations. 
 
Rachael Rangihaeata Information Commissioner (Qld) 
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Making cost–benefit analyses public (with clearly documented assumptions) ...greatly improves the 
transparency of decision making. Such transparency strengthens the incentives for decision makers to 
focus on the overall net benefits of projects. It also allows particular estimates (for example, of 
construction costs or patronage) to be debated and testing done on how the use of different estimates 
would affect the projects’ net benefits. Transparency can help to improve the quality of analyses because 
proponents and practitioners know that any flaws are likely to be exposed. 
Productivity Commission, Public Infrastructure (2014), 92-3 
 
 
Transparency is needed to ensure that no one within the contractor can hide problems and that it is in the 
contractors’ commercial interest to focus on their client’s (the government’s) needs. This requires more 
than just the key performance indicators reported to the client. 
For instance, it also requires public reporting and openness to public scrutiny; whistleblowing policies that 
encourage staff to report problems up the supply chain; and user feedback. 
United Kingdom National Audit Office, The Role of Major Contractors in the Delivery of Public 
Services (2013), 16 
 
 
Introduction and summary 
 
The outsourcing or contracting out of government services has increased significantly over the 
last quarter century, into areas that were previously considered to be core government functions. 
These include the provision of security for government installations, the hiring and firing of public 
servants, the administration of prisons, the printing of government documents, and the provision 
of publicly funded social services. The latest OECD survey reports that in 2011, on average across 
all member countries, 44% of government production costs were consumed by outsourcing, 
compared with 47% by government employees. On average, outsourcing represented 10% of GDP 
(OECD 2013). (Outsourcing, it should be remembered, does not necessarily reduce the level of 
government spending, only the proportion of government spending consumed by government 
employees.) 
 
Though generally viewed as a source of improved efficiency and effectiveness, outsourcing has 
always had its critics. The empirical evidence for the cost savings arising from outsourcing has 
been challenged, particularly the extrapolation from a few well- documented successes such as 
rubbish collection and cleaning to more complex services (the so-called 20% rule (Domberger et 
al. 1986; Domberger et al. 1993; Hodge 1996; Hodge 1998)). Some infrastructure projects 
championed as delivering major savings to taxpayers have failed to do so (e.g. Bloomfield et al. 
1998; Greve and Ejersbo 2002; Johnston 2010) and the value-for-money verdict on public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) remains mixed (Hodge 2010). 
 
Concerns have also been raised about the broader constitutional and political effects of 
transferring important government functions from the public to the private arena. 
Outsourcing has been seen as potentially undermining important democratic values such as 
accountability and transparency and the wider pursuit of the public interest (Taggart 1993; 
Minow 2003; Hodge and Coghill 2007). 
 
Government transparency, the subject of this paper, can be valued both for reasons of 
democratic principle and also instrumentally, as a means of improving the efficiency and 
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effectiveness of government performance (Heald 2006). The paper focuses on the latter, 
instrumental concerns. It examines whether restrictions on government transparency sometimes 
associated with outsourcing can be shown to impair the quality of government performance in 
relation to efficiency and effectiveness and, conversely, whether greater transparency of 
government outsourcing will lead to better performance. 
 
In this context, it is sometimes useful to distinguish different levels or degrees of government 
transparency, ranging from ‘internal transparency’, which refers to transparency within the 
contracting relationship, particularly access by government officials to information held by 
private contractors; through ‘limited public transparency’, including confidential access by agents 
of public accountability, such as independent auditors or reviewers, without full public disclosure; 
to full public transparency which implies availability to any members of the public. While full 
public disclosure is often the most desirable form of transparency, the lesser stages may be 
beneficial, both in themselves and as stepping stones to wider publicity. 
 
The paper begins by briefly identifying the main types of outsourcing contract before giving an 
overview of the main restrictions on transparency caused by moving from in-house provision of 
public services to outsourcing from private contractors. It then examines arguments and evidence 
suggesting that lack of transparency relating to various aspects of the contracting process can 
have a harmful effect on government performance and that, by the same token, increased 
transparency can lead to positive improvements. Discussion centres on three aspects of 
outsourcing; value-for-money efficiency, effectiveness of performance, and publicity of 
performance information. Finally, a number of lessons are drawn out for both government and 
public managers on how to increase the extent of transparency, and thereby the quality of 
outsourced performance (see Boxes 1 and 2). 
 
Box 1: Transparency in Outsourcing: Lessons for Governments 
 
Lesson 1: List online details of all government contracts above a certain value (with minimum 
threshold set at around $10,000). 
Lesson 2: Strictly define commercial-in-confidence criteria and provide independent audit of 
government agency compliance with criteria. 
Lesson 3: Maximise access of government auditors to design and implementation of outsourcing 
contracts. 
Lesson4: Require all major government contracts to adopt open-book accounting among 
contracting parties. 
Lesson 5: Provide access for administrative monitors such as ombudsmen to private contractors 
delivering services to the public. 
Lesson 6: Facilitate Freedom of Information access to information held by private contractors that 
is relevant to the provision of a publicly funded service. 
9  
Box 2: Transparency in Outsourcing: Lessons for Public Managers 
 
Lesson 1: Recognise that public access to information about outsourcing is generally in the 
public interest. 
Lesson 2: Recognise that value-for-money estimates of outsourcing proposals are always 
analytically contestable and subject to manipulation by vested interests. 
Lesson 3: Recognise the value of ongoing consultation not only with contractors but also with 
affected stakeholders and communities. 
Lesson 4: Recognise the value of publishing appropriate performance information. 
 
The relevant evidence is often not conclusive and calls for judgment in weighing its significance. 
There have been a number of general empirical studies on the relative costs of outsourcing, 
generalising from reasonably-sized samples of individual cases, for example the research that 
demonstrated the reduced costs of outsourcing certain easily specified functions (Hodge 1996, 
1998). More recently, PPPs have attracted considerable academic attention in relation to their 
costs (Hodge 2010). But these studies do not directly address the issue of transparency. For 
example, there is no research formally contrasting the costs or effectiveness of a large number of 
outsourcing arrangements differentiated by varying degrees of transparency. Indeed, the number 
and complexity of transparency mechanisms and the limited number of comparable examples 
make such multivariate research impracticable. 
 
Instead, evidence in this area relies on the analysis and interpretation of individual cases or small 
sets of cases from which reasonable inferences may be drawn. Some of the case studies focus on 
the absence of transparency and the adverse effect of such a deficiency on performance, leading 
to a judgment that greater transparency would have improved performance. Others are more 
positive in emphasis, seeking to show examples of where the presence of transparency 
mechanisms has contributed to superior performance. Overall, this evidence can be seen to 
support a conclusion that improved transparency leads to improved performance. But it is a 
conclusion that depends more on the qualitative interpretation and judgment of individual cases 
than on any hard quantitative data. 
 
 
Varieties of outsourcing 
 
Outsourcing is to be understood as a contractual arrangement in which a government or 
government agency, acting as principal, purchases specified goods and/or services from a private 
organisation or individual, acting as agent. Outsourcing contracts come in a number of different 
forms (Alford and O’Flynn 2011, 85-91), which can affect issues of accountability and 
transparency. 
 
One common distinction is between transactional and relational contracts. Transactional (or 
classical or spot) contracts are typical of a one-off market transaction in which all elements of the 
agreement, including the goods and services to be purchased and the price of purchase, are 
clearly specified in the contract and neither party can be obliged to act in ways not explicitly 
mentioned in the contract. Relational contracts, by contrast, are typical of ongoing relationships 
such as service contracts, in which the terms of agreement between principal and agent are more 
open-ended, allowing the parties more scope to exercise discretion and providing for 
adjustments to be made as the contract progresses. A typical example is a contract for managing 
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a detention centre. 
 
In practice, the distinction is not hard and fast, with many contracts containing different 
proportions of specific and open-ended conditions. One feature of the distinction relevant for 
transparency is that, in transactional contracting, accountability is focused on stated terms and 
their performance which can be clearly documented and therefore potentially available for 
external inspection. Relational contracts on the other hand – because they leave more to ongoing 
elaboration – are less informative as documents and depend more on discretionary judgments 
which may be harder to access and disclose to the public. For this reason, contracts with more 
relational elements tend to pose particular challenges for transparency. 
 
Relational contracts are sometimes referred to as ‘partnerships’, as in the term ‘public- private 
partnership’ which is used, for example, to describe long-term arrangements for the private 
sector to build and/or operate major transport infrastructure such as railways or motorways. 
Strictly speaking, the term ‘partnership’ implies that both parties come together in a spirit of 
collaboration and shared values, having an equal share in the project and deriving equal, if 
complementary, benefit from it. The notion of a partnership of equals is therefore incompatible 
with the principal-agent perspective that underlies outsourcing contracts, both relationship as 
well as transactional, and that places government in the role of controlling purchaser. Many 
academic analysts therefore make a sharp distinction between outsourcing contracts and 
partnerships (e.g. Bovaird 2004; Forrer et al. 2010; Reynaers 2013). 
 
In practice, however, the terms partnership and PPP are applied to many different types of 
arrangement between governments and private organisations (Hodge and Greve 2007). 
Some partnerships are genuinely equal and cooperative, particularly where governments 
cooperate with not-for profit community organisations, as for instance when government 
agencies and private charities work alongside each other in a humanitarian crisis. In other so-
called partnerships, however, the government plays a principal-like role with overall responsibility 
for the project. In the latter case, the description ‘partnership’ is more of a political euphemism, 
designed to gloss over the fact that governments are ultimately responsible and should be held 
accountable for a project even when large corporations are accorded considerable discretion 
over how the project is delivered. 
 
Certainly, in many major infrastructure or service contracts, the private providers contribute their 
own expertise and resources which are beyond the capacity of government. They may also be 
given responsibility for raising the initial capital, as in ‘private finance initiatives’ (PFIs), and may 
be expected to take a share of the financial risks involved. They may even help to shape the goals 
of the project as it develops, in cooperation with government officials. Nonetheless, in spite of the 
size and complexity of their contribution, they are still engaged in delivering public goods and 
services mandated by governments and are not free to impose their own values or priorities 
against those of government (Klijn and Teisman 2003). Even in relatively informal agreements 
between governments and non-profit organisations, the government often retains a controlling 
responsibility which prevents such arrangements from being partnerships of equals (Gazley 
2008). 
 
In this respect, the logical framework of such ‘partnerships’ is essentially the same as that of all 
outsourcing contracts, though they lie more at the relational than at the transactional end of the 
spectrum of outsourcing contracts, where managing the ongoing relationships between the 
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partners is particularly important (Zou et al. 2014). To the extent that governments are held 
responsible for the eventual outcomes of a partnership, such a partnership is properly treated as 
a form of contracting out or outsourcing, with the same accountability expectations as other such 
contracts. In this paper, therefore, some so-called partnerships will be included under the general 
heading of outsourcing, provided they fit the logical template of government as principal and 
contractor as agent. Indeed, much of the research on outsourcing over recent years has focused 
on this type of public-private partnership. 
 
 
Outsourcing and Transparency 
 
As already mentioned, a private contractor in an outsourcing arrangement is exempt from a 
number of accountability and transparency provisions that apply to government agencies carrying 
out similar functions. The precise extent to which outsourcing affects levels of public transparency 
depends on the details of the individual outsourcing contract and on how far the private 
contractor is required to make information available to government officials, ministers and 
members of the public. In general, however, the main exemptions from public-sector 
transparency are: 
 
(i) freedom from political inquiry. Private contractors are not accountable through the ministerial 
chain of command or through parliamentary scrutiny for their internal operations relating to how 
they provide the goods and services stipulated. For example, matters such as the employment 
conditions of staff and the detailed financial situation of the company, including the cost 
structure for the contract, are usually kept from public view, under the general provision of 
‘commercial-in-confidence’. These are matters that private companies operating in a competitive 
market would normally keep to themselves to avoid yielding advantages to their competitors, and 
which they would not expect to divulge to those with whom they do business. Government 
agencies, by contrast, are subject to political accountability and transparency, for example by 
legislative committees, in almost all areas of their activities. 
 
(ii) freedom from government audit. Private contractors are covered by company (‘corporations’) 
law, which requires certain levels of financial audit depending on their precise legal status. 
However, the extent of audit is less extensive than that required for public agencies operating 
under government financial regulations policed by the government auditors. Government 
auditors also conduct regular performance audits of government programs but they are not 
normally free to investigate the performance of private contractors. Government performance 
audits of outsourcing therefore tend to concentrate on the government’s role as contractor. 
 
(iii) freedom from administrative law. Private companies or individuals, though regulated by a 
number of areas of law, including commercial and industrial law, are generally not subject to the 
demands of administrative law, which covers individual administrative decisions and publicly 
adjudicates on whether they are in accordance with law and with the principles of natural justice, 
such as procedural fairness and reasonableness (Taggart 1992). Administrative law is enforced by 
designated institutions such as tribunals and ombudsmen that usually have no jurisdiction over 
the private sector. 
 
(iv) freedom from Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation. Private contractors are not directly 
subject to freedom of information laws that allow citizens to inquire after both information held 
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about them personally and about matters of general concern, subject to certain exemptions such 
as national security and confidentiality of decision-making. 
 
In practice, these exemptions from public transparency do not fully apply to all outsourcing 
contracts. In some cases, governments have legislated to extend some aspects of government 
transparency to contractors. In addition, as will be seen, contracts can include stipulations 
intended to compensate for some aspects of a transparency gap by requiring that the private 
contractor makes certain information available to government or the public or that certain 
aspects of the contractor’s operations be open to scrutiny from government accountability 
officers or parliamentary committees. Such exceptions to the normal private- sector exemptions 
constitute the main policy focus of the present paper and will be discussed in further detail below 
under the general description of lessons for government. 
 
 
Transparency and performance 
 
How differences in transparency involved in outsourcing services affect performance is a 
contested and evolving issue. Broadly speaking, the substance of the debate can be divided into 
two contrasting periods. The first period covers roughly the 1990s, in which discussion of 
outsourcing was dominated by a paradigm of outsourcing or contracting out as straightforward 
transactional contracting. In this model, objectives were easily specified and monitored by in-
house government officials and the gains from market competition were readily harvested 
through a competitive market of alternative suppliers backed by relatively low costs of changing 
suppliers. 
 
Advocates of outsourcing, such as the then Industry Commission (Industry Commission 1996), as 
well as claiming reduced costs, also stressed the benefits of increased transparency and 
accountability that came with the specification of objectives and the monitoring of performance. 
These formal communications over the terms of a contract constituted a new dimension of 
accountability for results and could also be said to increase transparency about performance, if 
only internal transparency between the contracting parties. 
 
In addition, the reduced compliance costs due to freedom from, for example, government audit 
and political accountability, meant less concern with internal process and record- keeping, and 
therefore more efficient production. Less red tape implied less cost. On this view, outsourcing 
traded off certain levels of accountability and transparency of internal operations for greater 
accountability for results and a more efficient eventual outcome (Mulgan 1997; Flinders 2005). 
 
Into the 21st century, the ground of argument has shifted significantly. In the first place, the 
argument that government agencies are unconcerned about specification of objectives and 
monitoring and measuring performance has lost its force with the widespread adoption of 
performance management within government bureaucracies. This trend has been reinforced by 
the common institutional separation of purchasing and providing within the structure of 
government itself, for example through the establishment of executive agencies controlled 
through contract-like performance agreements that specify desired outputs and means of 
assessing compliance. Outsourcing, while still encouraging specification and measurement of 
results (Blöndal 2005), can no longer be singled out as the only means of introducing new levels 
of transparency and accountability for outputs and outcomes (Marvel and Marvel 2007). 
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Moreover, since the late 1990s, the types of goods and services being outsourced by 
governments have extended beyond the more straightforward purchase of easily specified items 
to cover more complex tasks such as ongoing delivery of social services, as well as long-term 
public infrastructure projects viewed as contractual partnerships. As a result, the simple 
transactional contract is no longer the sole or even the dominant paradigm of outsourcing. That 
role has now been eclipsed by the relational contract and the PPP, which have become the main 
focus of research and discussion. In connection with these more complex types of contract, the 
former conclusions that outsourcing benefits from trading off the traditional public-sector 
demands of accountability and transparency no longer carry conviction. Indeed, evidence is 
mounting that more exposure of outsourcing arrangements to public view will improve rather 
than damage the quality of government performance. 
 
This evidence will be discussed as it relates to three aspects of performance under outsourcing 
and how they are affected by the comparative presence or absence of transparency mechanisms: 
(i) the extent of costs to be borne by government, which directly impinges on efficiency and value 
for money, and which is the most commonly studied aspect of outsourcing; (ii) the quality of 
performance in meeting objectives (desired outputs and outcomes); (iii) the collection and 
dissemination of performance information intended to assess and improve performance. 
 
 
Transparency and value for money 
 
The issue that has most concerned analysts of outsourcing is that of value for money, understood 
primarily as the cost of a project if outsourced in comparison with in-house provision, and 
whether the outsourced contracts are in the public interest. In theory, while private sector 
commercial contractors can be assumed to be maximising their own profit, those on the 
government side of contractual negotiations, whether politicians or government officials, are 
expected to safeguard the public interest by securing value for money. In practice, however, 
government members are often under pressure to follow short-term objectives at the cost of the 
broader interests of the public. 
 
In relation to long-term PPPs, politicians have an electoral incentive to enter into contracts with 
the private sector that deliver immediate benefits in the form of tangible facilities or services 
while postponing the costs well into the future. Treasury bureaucrats who advise them are 
naturally predisposed in favour of solutions that suit the government’s short-term fiscal agenda. 
Governments also rely heavily on external consultants, many of whom are also advising the 
private sector partners and may have a conflict of interest (Monteiro 2010, 266-8). Transparency 
is therefore needed to ensure that governments and their advisers are exposed to a wide range 
of alternative views as they decide how to act in the public interest. 
 
The Melbourne City Link road infrastructure project, begun in 1995, is a classic case of the 
difficulties arising from a lack of transparency that concealed the terms of the contract until it 
was too late to avoid serious cost overruns (see Box 3). 
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Box 3: The Melbourne City Link project 
 
The Melbourne City Link road infrastructure project, begun in 1995, is a classic case of the 
difficulties arising from lack of transparency. The contract was structured as a BOOT (‘build, 
own, operate-transfer’) project eventually costing over $2 billion. The project was mired in 
political controversy, which was fuelled by the lack of information available to the public 
about the details of the costings and the allocation of risk. The Freedom of Information Act did 
not apply to a ‘special project’, and the enabling legislation allowed due process requirements 
to be overruled. The Auditor-General was critical of the government’s refusal to disclose the 
extent of its obligations to the contractor, Transurban, to manage future traffic flows to 
generate toll revenue for the contractor. Critics were sceptical about long- term financial 
benefits to the government, complaining that the interests of the contractor had been 
favoured over those of the taxpayer. If more information had been available earlier, the 
government could have been forced to drive a harder bargain on behalf of the public. 
Key lesson: government secrecy about costings can lead to decisions overly favourable to 
contractors 
 
Sources: Hodge 2004; Hodge and Coghill 2007; Auditor-General of Victoria 1996. 
 
Many similar cases are reported internationally. Research into the accountability of PPPs in 
Belgium found that lack of openness over budgetary planning contributed to inefficiency and high 
transaction costs (Willems and Van Dooren 2011). A review of transport public- private 
partnerships in the United Kingdom found a number of PPPs where the public appeared to have 
suffered poor value for money, mainly because the terms of the contracts turned out to have 
unduly favoured the private contractors in the allocation of risk (Shaoul 2010; 2011). Whereas in 
theory PPPs are intended to allocate substantial risk to the private sector, in practice the risk 
often ends up rebounding on the government, for instance in the case of rail franchises such as 
the London Underground, which were claimed to be favourable to the taxpayer but have proved 
particularly costly and inefficient. Moreover, the inadequate financial reporting of a succession of 
failures meant that the reasons for failure, which depended on faults in the original contracts, 
were not sufficiently available to the public – and thus hampered any public questioning and 
adjustment of policy (Shaoul et al. 2013). 
 
In the United States, PPPs have been popular at all levels of government, particularly state and 
local government, where many such contractual arrangements have proved efficient and 
effective. However, an analysis of less successful ventures suggests a link between poor 
performance and a lack of transparency (Bloomfield 2006, 403-6). In some cases, the main 
purpose for preferring a PPP has been for reasons of budgetary appearance, to avoid formally 
adding to public debt. Governments have sometimes given the false impression that the private 
sector is bearing most of the expense, to the financial benefit of taxpayers, and have been 
unwilling to reveal accurate details of costs. 
 
In Plymouth County, Massachusetts, for example, county officials persuaded the local legislature 
to approve a non-bid contract with designated companies to build and operate a new 
correctional facility (Bloomfield 2006, 403-6). The government publicity for the project claimed 
that it was to be funded by private financing with no obligation of public funds, in spite of the fact 
that the government would be making significant payments to the contractors over a thirty-year 
period. These claims were repeated in government publications and taken up by pro-business 
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media outlets. In this way, government concealment and distortion of financial information 
prevented informed public criticism and contributed to a long-term financial outcome that gave 
poor value for money. 
 
In Nova Scotia, Canada, the provincial government embarked on a pilot program for a new 
approach to funding new schools that was intended to give value for money while also not 
requiring any addition to government debt (Vining and Boardman 2008, 29-30). The government 
entered into a series of contracts with different private companies for the purchase of land, the 
construction of school buildings, and the ongoing administration of the school. Subsequent inquiry 
by the provincial auditor-general ruled that the lease should be regarded as a capital lease and 
liabilities recorded as provincial debt. Moreover, critics raised doubts about the costs of the 
project, pointing out that the total expenditure outlays were approximately the same as those 
that would have been expended under normal government provision. However, at the end of the 
contract, ownership of the school remained with the leading contractor, not with the government 
as would normally have been the case. The government eventually bailed out of its PPP school 
scheme at considerable cost to taxpayers. Without external investigation and scrutiny, the losses 
to the public would have been even more extensive. 
 
In Ireland, which has had extensive experience with PPPs, a comparative study of three contracts 
for water service provision indicated the value of ex ante consultation and transparency (Reeves 
2013a). In all cases, departmental public servants were found to have had difficulty in 
understanding the complexity of the contracts and, when faced with the self-interested demands 
of contractors and the less than fully impartial analyses of consultants, were unable to extract 
sufficient benefits in the interests of taxpayers. 
However, the losses were much less severe in one of the contracts, where the government had 
allowed for initial discussion in a series of roundtable meetings. These included not only 
government representatives and consultants, but also stakeholders, such as existing employees, 
employees associations and independent experts (including the academic conducting the 
research). Although the government did not accept the final recommendation from the 
roundtable (that in-house provision be continued), the process of consultation and the 
information it produced helped the government secure much better value for money in the final 
contract. 
 
In the Danish local municipality of Farum in Denmark, the longstanding mayor resigned in 2002 as 
a result of a series of scandalous incidents, including inducements and kickbacks from commercial 
companies (Greve and Ejersbo 2002). Central to the scandals was the mayor’s handling of a 
number of major outsourcing contracts in which his government was found to have contravened 
EU standards in the tendering and letting of contracts on behalf of the municipality. 
Compounding the impression of corruption was the fact that few details were publicly available 
about the particular contracts with the relevant finance company and other contractors. Though 
critics complained the government was committing the ratepayers to massive future payments, 
the mayor and his financial advisers vigorously asserted, on unsatisfactory evidence, that the 
deals delivered value for money. Before the issue could be satisfactorily resolved, the mayor’s 
scandalous behavior precipitated his resignation and the national government took over 
administration of the municipality, radically restructuring the contractual arrangements. 
Spectacular failure of the outsourcing contracts had a number of causes but could be largely 
attributed to unorthodox financial dealings masked by a lack of transparency. 
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The general conclusion to be drawn from these and other examples is that governments and their 
paid advisers can have difficulty in securing value for money for the taxpayer in outsourcing 
arrangements, particularly long-term PPPs, if they are not subject to effective public scrutiny. 
Such scrutiny needs to apply to all stages of the contracting process, including the initial 
negotiation of the contracts, and allow for open public debate about the merits of the contracts 
in question. Public managers need to recognise that public disclosure of the financial aspects of 
outsourcing contracts is generally in the public interest. Merely holding public meetings, without 
disclosing adequate information, is insufficient to secure the full benefits of transparency, as in 
the badly managed Mangawhai wastewater scheme (see Box 4). 
 
Box 4: The Mangawhai community wastewater scheme 
 
In 2005, the Kaipara District Council in Northland, New Zealand entered into a PPP to build a 
wastewater treatment project in the Mangawhai estuary. The council sought innovation from the 
market, long-term certainty in wastewater treatment, affordability, and improved water quality 
in the Mangawhai estuary. The council’s preference for a PPP was based on a preference to keep 
the debt off the council’s balance sheet and to put as much risk as possible on the private sector 
provider. In the view of the New Zealand Controller and Auditor-General, however, the decision 
took the council ‘out of its depth’ and the project ended up as a ‘woeful saga’. The council put 
too much emphasis on achieving a certain accounting outcome and the transfer of risk, and not 
enough on value for money and affordability. It relied too much on the advice of its contractors 
and failed to maintain adequate accounts. The project ended up costing nearly double what was 
originally envisaged. 
The council allowed for a reasonable degree of local consultation, holding a number of public 
meetings at which it attempted unsuccessfully to answer public concerns about the project, 
particularly its costs to ratepayers. However, it did not give accurate details of the terms of the 
contract, partly through its own lack of expertise and dependence on the contractors for advice, 
and partly through its unwillingness to divulge commercial information. Greater transparency 
about the contract would have increased the pressure on the council to reconsider its plans and 
would have saved the ratepayers considerable additional expense. 
Key lesson: to be effective, public consultation about a decision to contract needs to be provided 
with accurate information about projected costings. 
 
Source: New Zealand Controller and Auditor-General 2013 
 
 
One major factor in favour of transparency is the uncertainty that underlies government 
calculations of the comparative costs of alternative proposals. The costing of long-term contracts 
involves a large number of assumptions, many of which are contestable, which can lead to great 
variation in predicted outcomes (Hodge 2010; Boardman and Vining 2010). For example, most 
analysts agree that private sector contractors face some additional costs when compared with 
government, including higher interest rates for borrowing and the need to return a profit to 
shareholders. These additional costs therefore need to be offset by, for example, improved 
efficiency in delivery and the transfer of financial risk from government to private contractors. To 
estimate these benefits requires the adoption of certain assumptions, such as a discount rate 
applied to future expenditure or a method for calculating the ‘public sector comparator’ (PSC) 
used to estimate the extent to which government provision would be more expensive than 
private. All such assumptions can reasonably be given varying values, which crucially affect 
17  
whether or not the contract appears to offer value for money. 
 
For example, the highly influential United Kingdom Treasury Green Book on public procurement, 
revised in 2003, required that when public provision was being compared with private provision, 
the estimated costs of public provision should be adjusted upwards by up to 24% in order to 
account for an ‘optimism’ bias in public service estimates. This inflator, which has been widely 
adopted internationally, was based on research that purported to show that most projects directly 
funded by government, rather than funded by private sector initiative (PFI), had a tendency to 
come in over budget. Allowing for this level of optimism bias usually meant that PFI provision 
came in at lesser cost. However, this supposed empirical base was later criticised for being highly 
unreliable, on the grounds that it depended on selection bias, small sample size and other 
methodological flaws (Pollock et al. 2007). Indeed, the possibility of establishing a reliable public 
sector comparator (PSC) has been largely discredited and, in the view of the Productivity 
Commission, such a benchmark figure should only be used as part of a transparent tendering 
process, allowing the PSC to be open to public contestation (Productivity Commission 2014, 136-
9; see also Reeves 2013b, 82-3). 
 
Similar arguments apply to the use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA), which is still regarded as the 
most reliable analytical tool for assessing public-private partnerships, especially in the 
infrastructure area. Many of the variables that enter into a CBA are based on assumptions that 
can be subject to dispute, particularly the attempt to quantify wider economic benefits. 
In the words of the Productivity Commission, ‘the key is full transparency, as the necessity to 
justify the methodology and assumptions acts as a significant constraint on poor decision making 
and arbitrary, poorly constructed analysis to justify a favourite project’ (Productivity Commission 
2014, 104). 
 
In the Commission’s view all major projects should be subjected to rigorous cost-benefit analyses 
that are publicly released and made available for due diligence by bidders. It rejects the common 
argument that costings should not be revealed for commercial-in-confidence reasons. Instead, 
the public interest is better served by open disclosure and the opportunity for opposing views to 
be held. It quotes the example of the Northern Sydney Freight Corridor, which was the subject of 
a confidential CBA. When eventually disclosed under FOI, the CBA was found to contain several 
questionable assumptions exaggerating future usage of an expanded rail expansion (Productivity 
Commission 2014, 105). Earlier disclosure could have saved the Commonwealth and State 
governments hundreds of millions of dollars. 
 
In a similar vein, in Canada the major contracting agencies for the province of Ontario 
(Infrastructure Ontario) and for British Columbia (Partnerships BC) have required that all PPP 
projects should be subject to publicly available value-for-money assessments at three important 
stages: at the point of selecting an appropriate procurement methodology; at the point of 
assessing bids; and at appropriate stages through the course of the contract (Murphy 2008, 109-
10). 
 
Value-for-money costings of major outsourcing contracts are not wholly technical, evidence- 
based analyses on which experts can rationally agree. To a considerable extent, they are multi-
faceted arguments in which different players have different priorities (Johnston 2010; Hodge and 
Greve 2013), and supporters of a particular outcome choose methods and evidence that will 
advance their cause. This point applies equally to both critics of outsourcing and to its supporters. 
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As a consequence, decisions to accept or reject a particular contract involve value choices. As 
such, in a democratic polity, they need to be subject to widespread public consultation and 
debate, with as much of the evidence and argument as possible available to the public. 
 
The case for transparency is particularly pressing when those privy to decision-making, including 
ministers, key bureaucrats, consultants, lobbyists and industry, are overwhelmingly disposed 
towards private provision, often for self-interested reasons. The necessary injection of 
skepticism, which might save governments and taxpayers from the more costly failures, depends 
on external critics having access to the relevant government information. Without such 
information being independently available, government claims to have achieved value for money 
must be treated with caution. Research shows that governments are unwilling to allow their 
optimistic forecasts of savings from outsourcing to be independently tested, thus suggesting that 
the forecasts themselves are unreliable (see Box 5). 
 
Box 5: Overstating the financial benefits of outsourcing 
 
A comparative study of outsourced clinical services in hospitals in a number of countries (Spain, 
Portugal, Australia and the United Kingdom) found that governments generally claimed that 
private provision was successful and superior to public provision. However, a number of 
conspicuous failures, where governments had been forced to take back clinical responsibility, 
suggested that the practice of outsourcing clinical hospital care was far from trouble free. 
Moreover, claims of improved efficiency often appeared to depend on biased cost comparisons, 
whereby certain costs that were typically borne by public sector hospitals may have been 
omitted from the calculation of contractor costs. However, analysts were unable to gain full 
access to the comparative costing and were therefore prevented from making an informed value-
for-money judgment. 
Key lesson: governments should allow full public access to comparative costings in the interests of 
avoiding unwise contracting decisions. 
 
Source: Acerete et al. 2012 
 
Public disclosure and debate over costing, it should be noted, need not necessarily lead to the 
rejection of original government proposals. For example, in Colorado in the United States, the 
state government sponsored a study of public libraries that recommended major changes based 
on a cost-benefit study of library use. Critics argued that the methodology did not provide an 
accurate projection of libraries’ true return on investment. However, the government report’s 
authors held meetings with their opponents and were able to explain the methodology to them, 
thus defusing much of the public concern surrounding the proposal (Pew-Macarthur 2003, 37). In 
this way, transparency and discussion helped to build community support. 
 
Without full transparency and the opportunity for public debate, attempts to open up discussion 
of major contract proposals may fall short. For example, the European Union has introduced a 
new ‘competitive dialogue’ (CD) process for the handling of public-private procurement. The CD 
process is intended to reduce some of the harmful effects of overlooking the complexity of major 
procurement projects, such as infrastructure projects, at the time of initial contracting. Under its 
provisions, public procuring authorities and private bidders enter into pre-bid discussions over 
public needs and requests and proposed private solutions. The aim is to deal with complexity 
through a combination of different governance strategies of coordination (bringing the various 
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parties and interests together), competition (encouraging prospective bidders to compete for the 
contract), and cooperation (making the various parties work out the project and possible 
solutions together). However, research on the use of CD in the Netherlands indicates that the CD 
process has yet to deliver its promised benefits, mainly because the government side is too 
concerned with formal coordination while the private players are overly focused on competition 
(Lenferink et al. 2013). In the researchers’ view, the process needs to give more emphasis to 
cooperation and to the possible benefits it can bring. It would also benefit from being more open 
to public dialogue and scrutiny. 
 
Public managers therefore need to treat the costing of major public contracts as a multifaceted 
exercise, in which input from stakeholders and the public is to be welcomed and fed into the 
decision-making process. Their advice to their political masters and bureaucratic superiors should 
take the form appropriate to the analysis of complex policy issues – carefully setting out the 
various options, identifying both the technical aspects and the particular interests involved. 
 
 
Transparency and quality of performance 
 
As well as value-for-money issues centring primarily on costs and efficiency, outsourcing 
contracts need to be assessed on effectiveness and the quality of their performance. What effect 
does transparency have on these values? A certain minimal level of internal transparency about 
performance is implicit in the contracting process itself, when contractors, in order to be paid, 
need to report on outputs to their government principals. But such transparency can be quite 
limited if reporting is restricted in scope, confined to one-off or infrequent information on 
outputs, or is internal only, being confidential to only a small number of government officials. 
However, if the assessment process is more open, in both the matters covered and the range of 
people involved, evidence suggests that increases in transparency leading to improved 
communication can have a beneficial effect on the quality of performance. This more open 
approach to managing contracts fits well with the recent management emphasis on achieving 
public value, which is a multifaceted and open-textured objective, requiring consultation and 
cooperation with a range of interested parties (Teicher et al. 2006). 
 
Particularly in ongoing relational contracts or partnerships, those involved need to be in regular 
communication in order to respond effectively to changing circumstances and to develop 
commitment to shared values (Forrer et al. 2010, 481). Where such contracts are for intra-
organisational services, such as human resources or IT, the ongoing consultation and sharing of 
information, on which the success of the contract depends (Stewart and Ablong 2013; Tai-Yi 
2014), is mainly confined to the government purchasers and private providers. However, where 
the contract is for services provided to the public, consultation between the contractual partners 
may also be usefully extended to external stakeholders. In this respect, partnerships become 
more like collaborative relationships, where different parties and stakeholders collaborate on the 
basis of trust and reciprocal exchange (Alford and O’Flynn 2012, ch 5), while still retaining the 
emphasis on delivering public value for governments and taxpayers that underpins all 
outsourcing. 
 
A comparative study of two Melbourne infrastructure projects demonstrates the value of 
widespread consultation during the construction and operation phases of a major infrastructure 
partnership (Alam et al. 2014). Planning for the EastLink project emphasised the development of 
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trust between the partners through continuous cooperation together with independent audits of 
progress. It also allowed for community feedback, through informative public displays and 
discussion forums (see Box 6). 
 
Box 6: The Melbourne EastLink project 
 
The EastLink road project in Melbourne, begun in 2004 and completed in 2009, involved a 
contract between the state government and ConnectEast, a consortium including financial and 
construction interests who then engaged Thiess John Holland (TJH) to design and construct 
EastLink. Costing AU$2.5 billion, it was the largest infrastructure project ever constructed in 
Victoria and was completed on budget and five months ahead of schedule. The management of 
the project had a number of innovative features. One was the provision for an independent 
reviewer to verify progress. The reviewer reported directly to the government and the 
ConnectEast consortium but had no links with TJH (the construction company), a degree of 
independence atypical of infrastructure projects. 
In addition, the partnership was founded on management principles of dividing tasks between 
different sections and different regions and then coordinating the different units by processes of 
continuous coordination and consultation. The emphasis on collaboration and shared trust 
within the contracting partners extended outward to the wider community. During the course of 
the project, the central project consultation group arranged 48 meetings with community groups 
and consulted with nine municipal councils as well as interest groups such as the transport users 
association and business communities in neighbourhood suburbs. Community displays were also 
mounted and discussion forums held in shopping centres. 
Key lesson: widespread stakeholder consultation can improve the quality of performance for 
outsourced services. 
 
Source: Alam et al. 2014 
 
The analysts contrasted the approach taken for this project with that for another less successful 
infrastructure project: the Southern Cross Station Redevelopment Project (Alam et al. 2014). In 
this partnership, collaboration and consultation were confined to formal meetings between the 
contracting parties, with little attempt to build relationships and trust. As a result, frequent 
misunderstandings and delays arose, which led to timing overruns, and therefore cost overruns as 
well as expensive litigation. Many variables no doubt contributed to the respective success and 
failure of the two projects. Nonetheless, a strong case can be made for linking the superior 
performance of EastLink with the readiness of the partners to consult informally in a spirit of 
cooperation, not only between themselves but also with external stakeholders and the wider 
community. 
 
This conclusion is confirmed by studies of PPP infrastructure projects in the Netherlands. For 
example, Koppenjan (2005) examined nine cases of public-private partnerships for transport 
infrastructure, dividing them into three groups. One group, which yielded poor results, involved 
very little joint planning and collaboration between the partners, leading to few opportunities for 
beneficial tradeoffs and enrichment of the project. Another group, which was also comparatively 
unsuccessful, provided for a high degree of consultative process with many meetings between 
the parties. However, the consultations took place at a tangent from existing decision-making 
structures and encouraged the parties to engage in impractical objectives, removed from the 
reality of government policy and community expectations. The third, most successful group 
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engaged in intensive, ongoing consultations which were effectively embedded in the wider 
political environment and allowed for joint adaptation to changing circumstances and demands. 
The lesson, therefore, was that consultation in itself is not enough but it needs to be integrated 
with the political environment through open procedures and willingness to listen. 
 
Research on the United Kingdom Highways Agency also demonstrated the advantages of building 
trust and cooperation with contractors. The Agency’s original approach had been to offer 
contracts for road maintenance to the lowest bidder and then to rely on each individual 
contractor to implement the terms of the contract, often through the use of sub- contractors. In 
response to repeated failures to achieve satisfactory performance, the Agency tried a new 
approach, based on a shared management framework, involving all contractors as well as the 
agency. All members of the framework were encouraged to consult with each other and their 
relevant communities and to share in the financial benefits (Johnson and Elliott 2011). 
 
The Wellington City Council entered into a PPP with a UK company for building and managing a 
modern sewage treatment plant. Initially, the Council adopted a very arms- length approach to 
contract management. However, a number of disputes over the cost and objectives of the project 
forced the Council to take a more active interest. As well as conducting more and more thorough 
inspections, the Council established a community liaison group that met 3-4 times per year and 
enabled the contractor to tailor its performance to take more account of community views (New 
Zealand Controller and Auditor-General 2006, Appendix 3). 
 
Similarly beneficial outcomes from regular consultation and transparency are also reported in the 
area of social service contracting. Systems of social assistance provision involving private sector 
organisations contracted to government have long been noted for their dependence on informal 
networks and frequent inter-organisational consultation between professionals (Considine and 
Lewis 2003). In the United States, a survey of government social service administrators across 27 
states that were engaged in performance-based contracting of social service provision found a 
strong consensus in favour of active collaboration with all relevant stakeholders (Collins-Camergo 
et al. 2011). Conversely, research into the health and housing sectors in the UK shows that where 
the outsourcing of social services has been dominated by short-term cost-cutting, mutual 
suspicion can lead to a loss of trust and a deterioration in the quality of service (Hebson et al. 
2003). 
 
To be effective, private social service providers need to be fully engaged with their government 
partners in all stages of policy development, implementation and assessment. In turn, providers 
themselves must also be prepared to consult with, and receive feedback from, the clients whom 
they are paid to serve, as well as the wider community. As the OECD Recommendation on Public-
Private Partnerships points out, ‘active involvement of NGOs and other civil society groups can 
create transparency about problematic issues that might otherwise be overlooked and become 
serious issues if not tackled at an early stage’ (OECD 2012, A. 1). 
 
The model of successful contractual performance that emerges from the social service sector is 
therefore one which adopts an open, ‘learning’ perspective, where all players and stakeholders 
are prepared to share and benefit from their various experiences. 
Transparency, both internally within the providing network and with external stakeholders and 
clients, is a necessary condition for successful learning. Public officials involved in the 
management of all long-term outsourcing contracts need to welcome openness and consultation 
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as essential to their effective performance. 
 
A management culture of openness, it should be noted, applies both internally and externally. 
Managers who are prepared to share information with contractual partners and submit to 
independent internal audit are also more ready to be similarly open and transparent with the 
public and vice versa. Conversely, unwillingness to trust contractual partners or welcome 
independent review only serves to confirm a defensive and secretive approach that cuts public 
managers off from the benefits of public discussion. 
 
 
Transparency of performance information 
 
Contracting has always emphasised the importance of clarifying objectives and reporting 
performance showing how far such objectives have been achieved. Indeed, this has been the basis 
of the claim that outsourcing improved public accountability. The level of such accountability is 
much increased if the performance information is made available not only to government 
purchasers but also to the wider public. The most high-profile examples of such transparency are 
found in relation to the provision of services where individual members of the public are offered 
a choice between alternative providers. For example, Job Services Australia provides regular 
quarterly star ratings of the various private-sector job assistance providers in its network. 
 
Internationally, similar ratings have been published with respect to private hospitals, medical 
practices, nursing homes and schools. The official rationale for such transparency is to inform the 
client’s choice, thus harnessing market-style competition to improve the quality of performance. 
However, research has shown that consumers themselves tend to pay little formal attention to 
published ratings (Mulgan 2012, 14-24). The main beneficial effects of such publication are seen 
to derive from the effects on management and professional providers of being publicly praised or 
named and shamed. Indeed, ratings are similarly employed even when consumer choice does not 
apply, as with prisons in the United Kingdom, which are rated annually on a four point scale by 
the National Offender Management Service. 
 
Government publication of performance information can apply across different sectors and its 
beneficial effects are not limited to outsourcing arrangements. On occasion, as with United States 
nursing home ratings, the providers are all private sector contractors. At other times, as with 
prisons, the relevant organisations may be drawn from both the private and the public sectors 
and assessed by an independent regulator applying similar standards to both outsourced and in-
house provision. Yet again, the performance information may be confined to solely public 
agencies, such as police forces. In each case, however, the evidence in favour of public 
transparency of performance information is similarly robust, as it depends on the reputational 
effects on managers and professionals, which can be assumed to be similarly effective in all 
sectors. All public managers should therefore welcome the publication of relevant performance 
information about outsourced services as a spur to improved performance. 
 
The effectiveness of publishing performance information in improving performance depends on 
the credibility of the information itself, particularly among those directly involved in providing the 
goods and services in question. Does the information faithfully capture the actual objectives of 
the organisation and the extent to which they have been met? Does it discourage gaming and the 
pursuit of more measureable objectives at the expense of other less tangible values? Is the 
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information collected reliable and not contaminated by dishonest reporting? Internationally, 
research has shown that performance measures are more effective if they include a range of 
relevant indicators (Dickinson 2009, 345-8) and have been discussed with those professionally 
engaged as well as with relevant stakeholders (Mulgan 2012, 25-6). 
 
Transparency has a role to play both in the setting of objectives and in the choice of relevant 
performance measures. In an outsourcing context, the objectives are typically set out at the 
beginning of the contract, being certain deliverables or targets that are to be met at certain times. 
Transparency, as we have seen, can have an important role in the initial process of establishing 
the framework of objectives and measurement which underlie the collection and dissemination 
of performance information. 
 
Moreover, where the contract is longer-term and comparatively open-ended in its terms, 
allowance must also be made for continuing consultation about many aspects of the project not 
excluding its overriding objectives. Such matters for ongoing discussion may also include the 
appropriateness of the relevant measures being used to assess performance. For example, the US 
state of Philadelphia operated a successful program of job assistance known as 
Philadelphia@Work which involved a contract with a trust-based organisation, Transitional Work 
Corporation. In spite of the goodwill on both sides, devising an appropriate set of objectives and 
performance targets proved very challenging because of the variety and complexity of individual 
cases. A process of ongoing consultation with stakeholders and regular adjustment was necessary 
in order to avoid targets that were either unrealistically demanding or too easily met (Cohen and 
Eimicke 2008, ch 8). 
 
Similarly, star rating systems are often the subject of constant evaluation and amendment, a 
process that needs to call on the experience not only of actual participants but also of external 
experts. The Job Services Australia network system of star ratings has been regularly evaluated in 
consultation with providers and other stakeholders. The most recent review recommended a 
more risk-based approach to compliance, with departmental audits to concentrate on poorer 
performers, leaving the more experienced and better-performing providers more scope to make 
their own decisions (DOE 2012). 
 
The greater the amount of relevant data that can be published about the assessment, the more 
informed and effective the comments of outside commentary. More broadly, transparency of 
data relating to contractual performance can help to encourage research and so improve 
performance. Particularly in the social services area, government contracting agencies are 
collecting increasingly large banks of data about the activities of their private sector partners. In 
the area of child welfare assistance, for instance, researchers in the United States have been 
using statistical modelling to help administrators    compare contractors as well as make intra-
agency comparisons (Collins-Camargo et al. 
2011, 511). Using a learning organisation approach, administrators can encourage their staff at all 
levels to share data with clients and other key stakeholders as a means of gaining insights into 
how they could better meet their objectives. 
 
In general, then, there is strong evidence to suggest that greater transparency surrounding all 
stages of the government outsourcing process, from initial planning through implementation to 
final assessment, can yield significant improvement in performance. This evidence has become 
stronger with trends to outsource more complex and politically contentious aspects of 
24  
government that require a more open and consultative style of management. In response, the 
learning approach has become the dominant model for handling public-private arrangements, in 
contrast to an earlier emphasis on predefining set objectives and monitoring through 
predetermined performance indicators. Indeed, the shift towards a learning paradigm is itself the 
result of a collective learning experience, as governments, contractors and commentators have 
come to see the wisdom of open-ended, consultative management. One essential prerequisite for 
such an approach to flourish is the transparency of information relevant to all aspects of the 
contracting process. 
 
 
Increasing the transparency of outsourcing: lessons for governments 
 
If increases in transparency help to improve the quality of outsourcing, what steps should 
governments take in order to make outsourcing more transparent? A number of strategies are 
listed below, which can be summarised as ‘lessons for governments’ (see Box 1 above). 
 
Online publication of contracts 
One standard transparency mechanism is online publication of government contracts on 
government websites, which has now become international best practice. The US has been a 
leader in this area, with its government website (www.USAspending.gov) operating under the 
Federal Accountability and Transparency Act 2006, which lists all outsourcing contracts with 
government suppliers, giving the names of the supplier and the contracting agency, the sum 
involved, and a general description of the purpose of the contract. There is no minimum cut-off 
sum for listing, though contracts under $25,000 may be aggregated into       related clusters. The 
website also provides summaries of trends in procurement spending. 
The UK has followed suit with its own website, part of the government’s transparency policy 
(www.contractsfinder.gov.uk) – though, in the view of the National Audit office (NAO), the 
information given is less comprehensive than in its US counterpart, particularly in the number of 
contracts listed (NAO 2103, 52). In Australia, the Australian federal government’s AusTender 
website (www.tenders.gov.au) lists all contracts over $10,000 for non-corporate agencies (for 
corporate agencies the limit is $400, 000 except for construction contracts where the limit is $7.5 
million) (DOF 2014). Most state and territory governments operate similar websites, though with 
varying thresholds (e.g. $10,000 in Queensland (www.data.qld.gov.au), $100,000 in Victoria 
(www.tenders.vic.gov.au) and $150,000 in New South Wales (www.finance.nsw.gov.au)). 
 
In all cases, tender submissions remain confidential and contracts are not listed until they have 
been agreed on, thus limiting the value of such disclosure for the initial planning and contracting 
stages. Moreover, the level of detail given is usually fairly limited. Nonetheless, such publication 
does help to expose the parties, both government and private sector, to a certain level of scrutiny. 
It can also be an entry point for further inquiry, for example under FOI legislation, in which case 
the Australian Commonwealth requirement that the listed details include whether or not the 
contract contains commercially confidential information (see below) can be helpful to inquirers. 
 
Pushing back on commercial confidentiality 
One of the key barriers to public transparency of value for money costings and other details of 
outsourcing arrangements is the principle of commercial confidentiality. This principle holds that 
matters relating to the contracting process should be treated as ‘commercial-in- confidence’ if 
their publication could adversely affect the commercial operations of private contracting 
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companies. The principle is well-established in administrative law, constituting one of the regular 
exemptions to disclosure under FOI legislation where the public interest in disclosure needs to be 
balanced against the case for confidentiality. In order to override the general presumption in 
favour of transparency, the potential damage to the contracting company needs to be more than 
simple embarrassment or discomfort but should constitute substantial damage with significant 
financial consequences. The New Zealand FOI Act, for example, allows information to be withheld 
that ‘would disclose a trade secret’ or is ‘likely unreasonably to prejudice the commercial position 
of the person who supplied or is the subject of the information’ (Official Information Act 1982, s 9 
(2) (b)). 
 
The principle itself is fully justifiable. Companies tendering for, or securing, a government 
contract should not be required to divulge information that, if disclosed, could materially damage 
their competitive standing in the market. However, the problem with the commercial-in-
confidence principle lies in how it is applied. Governments themselves are typically the arbiters of 
what is to count as commercial-in-confidence and frequently extend the principle beyond its 
legitimate scope. In some cases where lack of transparency has caused governments to secure 
poor value for money in negotiating contracts, the reason has been the unjustifiable application 
of commercial confidentiality to information that could well have been open to public view. 
While the ostensible reason may be to protect the commercial interests of private contractors, 
the actual motive has often been government unwillingness to share information with the public. 
 
The fact that refusal to disclose commercial information is sometimes unwarranted is 
demonstrated by regular successful appeals against government misuse of the FOI exemption on 
grounds of commercial confidence. For example, in the United Kingdom, the Bristol City Council 
in 2009 cited commercial confidentiality as a ground for turning down an FOI request about the 
cost of an information technology contract for schools managed by a private company. The 
contract was one of over a hundred contracts between the council and the contacting company 
which were routinely kept confidential. Appeal to the Information Commissioner’s Office 
eventually led to the refusal being overturned on public interest grounds and the council was 
ordered to release both the costs of the information technology and the contract (Shaoul 2011, 
218) 
 
In many cases governments decide to withhold information received from contracting companies 
that the companies themselves would be prepared to disclose. The recent inquiry conducted by 
the United Kingdom House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (PAC) provides important 
evidence on this point. The inquiry was prompted by an earlier NAO report on the contracting 
services of four major international contracting companies: Atos, Capita, G4S and Serco (NAO 
2013). Representatives of each of the four companies appeared before the PAC to answer 
questions. On the issue of transparency and commercial confidence, all agreed that their 
companies would be willing to disclose more information than was typically made available and 
that they would comply with many of the FOI requests that are made in relation to their contracts. 
Resistance to disclosure, in their view, came mainly from the government departments that acted 
as gatekeepers for the shared information. The inference is that governments, particularly 
departmental officials, are excessively cautious in releasing information and that they misuse the 
argument of supposed damage to commercial interests as a fig-leaf for their own reluctance to 
disclose. 
 
Public disclosure need not entail full disclosure to all interested members of the public, but can 
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be restricted to the public’s representatives, such as members of legislative committees or 
government auditors. In some more commercially sensitive areas, such people can be expected 
to respect the confidence of governments and contractors while exercising independent scrutiny 
in the public interest. 
 
Auditors-General have internationally been in the frontline of opposition to the excessive 
application of the commercial-in-confidence principle to restrict their access to matters of 
government expenditure that they would normally be free to examine. The former 
Commonwealth Auditor-General, Pat Barrett, was an early critic (e.g. Barrett 2001) whose 
influence helped to develop the Australian National Audit Office’s active role in carefully 
developing legitimate principles of commercial confidentiality. These principles are now set out in 
the Department of Finance’s procurement policy and subject to annual scrutiny by the Auditor-
General (see Box 7). 
 
Box 7: Australian Commonwealth Senate Order on Departmental and Agency Contracts 
 
The Senate Order, instituted in 2001, requires relevant ministers to table advice for each agency 
confirming that they have published online lists of relevant contracts valued at more than 
$100,000. These must give certain details including the name of the contractor, the amount, the 
purpose, and the commencement date. The list must also specify any requirements for 
confidentiality and the reasons for such requirements. The Department of Finance gives advice 
on what criteria must be met for a matter to be legitimately considered commercial-in-
confidence: 
- the information to be protected is specifically identified. 
- the information is commercially ‘sensitive’. 
- disclosure would cause unreasonable detriment to the owner of the information or another 
party. 
- the information was provided under an understanding that it would remain confidential.  
The Auditor-General reports annually (biennially from 2014) on whether the order has been 
complied with and samples a number of agency lists to see whether the commercial-in- 
confidence criteria have been met. 
Key lesson: government auditors should monitor the use of commercial-in-confidence reasons for 
restricting transparency 
 
Source: DOF 2014
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The latest ANAO report records a general reduction in the proportion of government contracts 
containing confidentiality clauses (from 24% in 2001 to 4% in 2012), while a small but not 
insignificant proportion (9%) of contracts with confidentiality provisions, in the opinion of the 
ANAO, applied the criteria wrongly (ANAO 2103). 
 
The value of the Australian Audit Office’s approach to limiting the scope of commercial 
confidentiality was illustrated by a Canadian academic analysis. It used the ANAO’s criteria to 
assess the British Columbian government’s resort to commercial confidentiality in developing 
a PPP for an urban railway line in Vancouver (the Canada Line) (Siemiatycki 2010). Judged 
according to ANAO standards, the provincial government practice, though partly acceptable, 
was significantly deficient in many respects, including in the refusal to release certain 
information about the system design, construction methods and financial models in competing 
contracts after such information had ceased to be commercially sensitive. In addition, it was 
clear that the government was willing to release information that could properly have been 
judged commercial-in-confidence when such information suited the government’s advocacy in 
favour of the successful contractors. In other words, the government was using political 
advantage, not commercial sensitivity, as its criterion for deciding on disclosure. Such a 
conclusion strengthened the case for an independent monitor, such as an auditor-general, to 
be the arbiter of what information is judged to commercially confidential. In general, 
governments should make every effort to strictly define and constrain the scope of 
commercial-in-confidence criteria, while also providing independent audit of government 
agency compliance with criteria. 
 
Access for government auditors and independent reviewers 
As will have become apparent, government auditors have been very active in increasing the 
transparency of government outsourcing by exercising independent, critical scrutiny over the 
letting of government contracts. In many individual cases, an audit report has provided the 
most authoritative and influential critique of government inefficiency in the contracting 
process. More generally, auditors have sought to break down the secrecy surrounding many 
aspects of outsourcing in an attempt to subject the actions of officials engaged in contracting 
to the same, or similar, levels of oversight as those that apply to officials’ other activities. As 
the OECD report on PPPs emphasises, supreme audit institutions have ‘an important role in 
examining whether the risks involved in PPPs are managed effectively’ (OECD 2012, A.2). 
Indeed, maximising the access of auditors in monitoring government contracts is an important 
instrument of government transparency. 
 
One aspect of this campaign has been challenging the limits of commercial confidentiality, as 
discussed above. Another strategy is to extend the auditors’ rights of access to contractors’ 
information and premises by including a specific clause to that effect in the contract. The 
Australian Commonwealth, for example, has developed standard non- mandatory clauses that 
government agencies are encouraged to include in their contracts. These clauses only concern 
access to matters relating to the performance of the contract, but they cover issues such as 
keeping records, adopting Australian accounting standards, allowing audits of operational 
practices, security, and privacy protections (DOF 2007; ANAO 2012). 
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Traditionally, government audit has been confined to the auditing of government agencies. 
However, as guardians of the probity, efficiency and effectiveness with which public funds are 
spent, they have staked a claim for scrutinising all government expenditure, regardless of 
whether the responsibility for such expenditure lies with public or private agencies. In the 
common phrase, they have sought ‘to follow the money’, into the private sector if necessary. 
Amendments to the Commonwealth Audit Act passed in 2011 extended the jurisdiction of the 
Auditor-General to include performance audits of ‘government partners’ (section 18B) which 
included not only state and territory governments but also other contractors performing 
functions paid for by the Commonwealth. To date, however, no audits have been conducted of 
private contractors. 
 
As well as government auditors, other types of independent monitors and auditors have 
proved useful in helping to oversee the conduct of contracts. Ireland, for example, established 
the position of a formal process auditor to examine all large-scale contracts (Reeves 2007, 
337). Former New South Wales Premier, Nick Greiner, proposed an independent oversight 
authority to supervise all PPPs, in both the planning and the implementation stages, as a 
means of safeguarding the public interest which tended to be overlooked if decisions were left 
to the main players and their advisers (Johnston and Gudergan 579). Research from the 
Netherlands also reports on the value of independent monitoring of the progress of PPPs 
(Reynaers 2013, 46).Though such a body would not necessarily report in public, it would 
increase internal transparency. 
 
Open-book accounting 
Another potential mechanism for increasing transparency and also reducing the extent of 
commercial confidentiality is the use of ‘open-book’ accounting in the management of 
outsourcing contracts (Principle 4). Open-book accounting was first developed in the private 
sector in relation to partnerships between firms with interlocking functions, for example 
manufacturers of complementary products or buyers and suppliers in a particular industry. As 
the name suggests, open-book accounting provides partners with mutual access to aspects of 
each other’s financial information as a means of facilitating contractual arrangements and 
building trust between them (Caglio and Ditillo 2012). On the same rationale, it can also be 
extended to public-private partnerships, particularly as a means of allowing the government to 
gain access to information held by private contractors that may be relevant. 
 
Open-book accounting in PPPs has been particularly common in the UK, where some form of 
open-book provision is written into an increasing number of ongoing contractual 
arrangements. The NAO report into the four large contractors revealed that around two out of 
every five government contracts they held included open-book provisions (NAO 2013, 35). 
Under open-book accounting the contractor is required either to update the client department 
regularly on their costs and profit or to allow the client department to audit such costs on an 
ad hoc basis. The NAO report noted, however, that many client departments made little use of 
their access. From the NAO’s perspective, the advantage of open-book accounting is that it 
allowed the NAO itself to have access to contractors’ financial information that was available 
to the client department and thus to make its own judgments on such matters as the level of 
profit being made by the contractor. 
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The UK Public Accounts Committee in its follow-up response to the NAO report also 
emphasised the value of open-book accounting and recommended it be applied to all 
government contracts (UK PAC 2014, 5). It noted the Cabinet Office view that departments 
often lacked the ability to use open-book accounting and would need to improve their 
capability significantly to make it work in practice. The major contractors, by contrast, while 
differing over the details of what information they were ready to share, had no objection in 
principle. This view was echoed by the leading British business peak body, the Confederation of 
British Industry (CBI), which urged the adoption of open-book accounting for all government 
contracts and claimed that governments were typically more reluctant than businesses to 
disclose financial information (Plimmer 2014). 
 
Open-book accounting does not necessarily entail full disclosure to the public and so does not 
necessarily enable open public discussion of all details of contracts. However, by guaranteeing 
that contractors make otherwise confidential information available not only to government 
officials but also to independent monitors such as auditors it does serve to lift, to some extent, 
the veil of commercial confidentiality that might otherwise surround the contracting process. 
 
Access to administrative law remedies including Freedom of Information 
Private individuals and companies are generally not subject to administrative law, which is 
normally confined to reviewing the decisions of public organisations. However, the increasing 
use of private sector providers to deliver publicly funded services, particularly services directly 
to members of the public, has raised the issue of whether the boundaries of administrative law 
are unduly constricted and whether citizens receiving services from private providers should 
have access to the same legal remedies as they have when dealing with public organisations 
(e.g. Minow 2002). This concern has led to the search for new ways to apply the values of 
administrative law, such as transparency, due process and equal protection, to third-party 
contractors (e.g. Rosenbloom and Piotrowski 2005; Benish and Levi-Faur 2012). 
 
In some areas, the reach of an administrative law remedy can be extended to cover the actions 
of private contractors. For example, in some jurisdictions, ombudsmen are entitled to 
investigate complaints against government contractors as well as against government agencies 
(e.g. Commonwealth Ombudsman Act s 3BA). Alternatively, designated ombudsmen can be 
established to deal with public complaints about service delivery from private contractors. For 
example, the Victorian Public Transport Ombudsman is a not-for- profit agency established by 
the government but funded by public transport operators in response to public demands for an 
official avenue for passenger complaints (Hodge and Coghill 2007, 688-9). 
 
Freedom of Information legislation is another major mechanism for securing transparency of 
outsourcing. Some states in the United States extend their FOI laws to grant direct access to 
private contracting companies performing publicly-funded functions (Rosenbloom and 
Piotrowski 2005, 114-5). Alternatively, access can be made via the government purchasing 
body. FOI requests to a purchasing agency can reach information held by a private contractor 
provided that information is available to the government agency and is not subject to overly 
restrictive commercial-in-confidence exemptions. For example, in the US state of Wisconsin, 
the Open Record Act (the state’s FOI law) requires that each government authority should 
make available any record produced or collected under a contract ‘to the same extent as if the 
record were maintained by the authority’ (Wis. Stat. 19.36 (3), quoted in Benish and Levi-Faur 
2012, 891-2). 
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Increasing the transparency of outsourcing: lessons for public managers 
 
Government policies can do much to assist the transparency of outsourcing, but the most 
important contribution comes from public managers themselves, not only in faithfully 
implementing the policies but also in their general approach to dealing with contracts, 
contractors, interested stakeholders and the general public. This survey of research into the 
relationship between transparency and performance allows public managers to derive a 
number of positive lessons in favour of increasing transparency around the contracting process 
(see Box 2 above). 
 
Lesson 1: Recognise that public access to information about outsourcing is generally in the 
public interest. 
Public managers tend to be naturally cautious towards public disclosure of information relating 
to contracts, partly for fear of exposing themselves or their political masters to criticism and 
adverse publicity, and partly through a belief that all information held by private companies 
should be treated as commercial-in-confidence. They should realise that if public disclosure 
can lead to benefits in the public interest, both they and their political masters also stand to 
gain from such disclosure. They should learn to welcome critical public discussion as a useful 
aid to successful management. At the same time, they should accept, and teach their 
commercial partners, that commercial-in-confidence protection applies to only a limited set of 
commercial information. 
 
Lesson 2: Recognise that value-for-money estimates of outsourcing proposals are always 
analytically contestable and subject to manipulation by vested interests. 
In relation to value-for-money costings, including cost-benefit analyses, public managers 
should accept the inevitable methodological limitations in all such studies and should treat 
them as open to challenge from independent critics. They should take a skeptical approach to 
all analyses emanating from advisers with a vested interest in a particular outcome, including 
the government’s own preferred consultants. In the interests of financial efficiency, they 
should make all value-for-money analyses available for public comment. 
 
Lesson 3: Recognise the value of ongoing consultation not only with contractors but also with 
affected stakeholders and communities. 
Public managers should also make sure that, once a contract is signed, they have established 
channels for continuing dialogue with contractors as a means of encouraging successful 
outcomes. Such dialogue should be as open as possible and should also include regular 
consultation with relevant stakeholders and communities. Continuing discussion is particularly 
important in the case of contracts lasting over several years or where contractors provide 
services directly to members of the public. 
 
Lesson 4: Recognise the value of publishing appropriate performance information Public 
managers should aim to publish as much information as possible relating to the performance 
of contractors. Such information frequently forms part of the contractual agreement, being 
required for the authorisation of payment. But performance information should be available 
not just to the contracting parties but also to the wider public as a means of naming and 
shaming poor performers and encouraging improved performance. 
 
Performance information needs to be appropriate to the performance being assessed. Minimal 
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quantitative indicators may be sufficient to assess a straightforward task, such as the 
management of a rail service, but for more complex services such as managing a medical 
practice or a prison, a greater range of more sophisticated measures may be necessary. In such 
cases, international experience has confirmed the value of aggregate measures (e.g. star 
ratings), which allow a multi-faceted judgment to be summarised into a manageable, if 
inevitably simplified, measure. 
 
Putting all these lessons into practice will often not be easy. Managers are naturally 
constrained by their governments’ policies on transparency, which may be overly restrictive. 
Moreover, longstanding habits of bureaucratic secrecy can discourage change towards a more 
open administrative culture. Managers who have themselves become convinced of the value of 
transparency need to be willing to challenge the prevailing culture of caution. 
They need to persuade not only their colleagues but also ministers and their political advisers 
that transparency of the contracting process is, in the long run, less risky and more prudent 
than secrecy. 
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